

SECRET

DDS&T #3515-65
2 August 1965


MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Current Intelligence

SUBJECT: Comments on Draft CIA Ops Center
SOP, 31 July 1965

1. The subject of the SOP is "Critical Intelligence Alerting Procedures" and the procedures set forth in Paragraph III, after defining critical intelligence in Paragraph II, do indeed attempt to cover "critical intelligence". Nevertheless, it is my understanding that the primary reason for re-examining procedures is to find a way of moving current intelligence, not necessarily critical intelligence, in a way which particularly suits our current DCI's concepts and operating procedures. I agree that your Paragraph I, titled "General", does attempt to broaden the current intelligence dissemination problem beyond critical intelligence, but leaves the matter there and fails to prescribe SOPs for the "non-critical intelligence". *see SOP on other procedures.*

2. I believe the reason why the DCI is still considering the establishment during non-duty hours and weekends of a senior duty officer who shall be on the premises and act for him is largely because many items of intelligence are passed to the Director by relatively junior officers, frequently without reference to actions already initiated within the Agency, thereby leaving the Director with the impression that it is up to him to act. I know of no way of satisfying the Director in these matters unless an SOP is spelled out requiring the appropriate senior official of the Agency, depending on subject matter, to bring the intelligence item personally to the DCI's attention with all relevant data and a statement that such and such actions have already been

SECRET



~~SECRET~~

DDS&T #3515-65

taken or are about to be taken. I do not believe that Paragraph D of I is sufficiently precise to accomplish the desired results.

3. On alert procedures for critical intelligence (III), I have the following comments to offer:

✓ a. It seems to me that this section in its first sentence sounds a note of imprecision. For instance, what are the general guidelines which the SDO should follow in making determinations as to what the priorities for action shall be?


✓ b. Furthermore, there is no provision made for appropriate passage of Critics or critical intelligence to components other than the DDI and the Office of the DCI. In many instances I would have thought the DDP or others would be required to be informed and get in on the act at the earliest possible opportunity.

✓ c. III,F carries the implication that the Chairman of the Watch Committee has only a limited need to be advised of critical intelligence. This gives me a welcome opportunity to repeat that in my view, the intelligence made available to me through DDI is far too narrowly focused to allow me to keep fully abreast of the broad implications of world developments which must represent the framework in which Watch Committee deliberations are conducted.

✓ d. With particular reference to III,F,1, I know of no precedent for, and can hardly conceive why, the DDI should call a Watch Committee meeting without reference to the Chairman of the Watch Committee. It has long been the practice in matters affecting the Watch Committee that it is the Chairman's duty to take the initiative and advise the DCI and DDCI in such matters.

25X1C e. With regard to III,1,g, since a triggering of [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

DDS&T #3515-65

25X1C

[REDACTED] is an important action
bringing into play in the Watch Committee context

25X1C

25X1C

[REDACTED] no such action should be taken without
the DCI's foreknowledge on the recommendation of
the Chairman, USIB Watch Committee. For your in-
formation, this mechanism since its inception in
May 1957 has only been placed in operation once,
and obviously involved certain political considera-
tion as well as purely intelligence considerations.

25X1A

[REDACTED]
Chairman, USIB Watch Committee

cc: Executive Director

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification